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Introduction 
 
In this paper we look at economic liberalization – both in the context of countries 
under transition from communism to capitalism, and in the context of developed 
market economies of North America and Western Europe. By “liberalization” we 
mean not just opening to external trade and capital, but also the freeing up of 
domestic trade and prices, as well as labor’s ability to respond to national and 
international shifts in demand. We begin by reviewing briefly two recent books on 
the international aspects of liberalization, what has come to be known as 
“globalization”. We then identify controversial aspects of reform in transition 
countries, and market economies, and review some of the recent empirical literature. 
Broadly, controversy surrounds the optimal pace and appropriate sequencing of 
reform, as well as the extent of liberalization. Finally, we draw out policy 
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implications of our analysis with a view to casting light on the debates over 
broadening and deepening of integration in the Americas. 
 
The globalization controversy 
 
Ever since the 1999 WTO meetings in Seattle, the word “globalization” has become 
infused with passion, with strongly-held opinions both pro and con. By economic 
globalization is usually meant free international movement of goods, services, 
capital and people: that is what we will comment on here, although the globalization 
of ideas and culture is perhaps even more profound.  
 
Many economists were shocked and dismayed when one of their finest – Joseph 
Stiglitz – apparently broke ranks with the profession when he published his 2002 
book, Globalization and Its Discontents. But Stiglitz’s book is by no means a 
condemnation of globalization per se; rather it is a critique of the management of 
globalization by international institutions, especially the IMF and the WTO: 
institutions, moreover, that are dominated by developed-world interests. What 
shocks many economists, perhaps, is the passion with which Stiglitz makes his case. 
Passion is not an emotion that economists easily condone.  
 
A more recent, and more nuanced, contribution to the globalization debate is 
Jagdish Bhagwati’s 2004 book, In  Defense of Globalization. As befits one of the 
profession’s most practiced and prominent defenders of free trade, Bhagwati takes 
on all the common shibboleths about globalization: that it increases poverty, induces 
child labor, harms women, threatens democracy, imperils national cultures, 
undermines wage and labor standards, threatens the natural environment, and 
enhances predatory corporate power. He dismisses all these shibboleths both 
theoretically and empirically. Much of his theoretical logic follows from the 
economists’ first article of faith – that trade voluntarily entered into between two 
parties must perforce benefit both parties. But there are subtleties: Bhagwati 
recognizes that when trade agreements are made at aggregate and national levels, 
some individuals will be made worse off just as others are made better off: Pareto 
improvements are virtually impossible.1  
 
There is less substantive difference between Stiglitz’s “discontent” and Bhagwati’s 
“defense” than would first appear.  Stiglitz highlights losers, Bhagwati highlights 
winners. Neither denies that globalization will produce both.  Both recognize that 
free trade in capital is generically different from free trade in goods .… And both 
recognize that the pace, coordination and sequencing of liberalizing reforms is crucial 
to their success in enhancing aggregate welfare. This is a theme to which we will turn 
shortly in the broader context of reforms in transition economies.  
 
Nevertheless there are substantive differences. Stiglitz puts much less faith in the 
efficiency, let alone fairness, of markets, as befits his position as the premier pioneer 
                                                 
1 Similar arguments are made in another important recent contribution to the debate, Wolf (2004), who, as 
the title of his book suggests, comes down on the side of Bhagwati rather than Stiglitz. 
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of the theoretical consequences for market outcomes of asymmetric information 
between parties to a trade.  Bhagwati is of the view that rough justice will prevail 
over time.  In one instance (p. 255) Bhagwati actually challenges Stiglitz directly: 
Stigltz argues that imposing free trade on developing countries adds to their 
already-high rates of unemployment because of import competition. Bhagwati 
argues that, on the contrary, unemployment is unlikely to rise much if at all because 
new jobs will be created in export industries. Moreover, he points out that gains to 
consumers through lower prices must be set against losses to (some) workers. Hence 
at a theoretical level he is not only less concerned than Stiglitz about preserving 
Pareto optimality, at an empirical level he makes a different judgment about the 
effects of free trade on aggregate unemployment.  Bhagwati takes a longer view of 
the relative attitudes of the World Bank and the IMF on tariff reduction, pointing 
out that traditionally it was the IMF that resisted free trade because tariffs 
represented an important source of revenue for governments facing balance of 
payments problems.   
 
Economists pontificating on the liberalization of transition economies ten or even 
fifteen years ago were divided into two camps: big-bangers and gradualists. Big-
bangers like Jeffery Sachs pointed to the success of rapid, simultaneous reforms in 
Poland. Gradualists cited Ronald McKinnon’s pioneering 1993 book on the 
sequencing of reforms and pointed to China as a patent success and Russia as an 
abject failure (Dean, 2000c). To quote Bhagwati, “Today, the shock therapists have 
retreated, given the havoc that many feel they wreaked in Russia.” (p. 253). 
Bhagwati remarks that even  Adam Smith was no big-banger:  
 
It may sometimes be a matter of deliberation, how far, or in what manner it is proper to 
restore the free importation of foreign goods … when particular manufacturers, by 
means of high duties or prohibitions upon all foreign goods which come into 
competition with them, have been so far extended as to employ a great multitude of 
hands. Humanity may in this case require that freedom of trade should be restored 
only by slow graduations, and with a good deal of reserve and circumspection. (Smith, 
1937).    
 
Sequencing 
 
Most economists now agree that some reforms should precede others. For example, 
privatization without competition may merely substitute private monopoly for 
public monopoly. Privatization without legal enforcement and transparency of 
property rights leads to oligarchy and probably a mafia. Capital account 
liberalization prior to banking reform is a recipe for systemic financial crisis. 
Uneven price liberalization is a recipe for corruption. All of this would seem 
elementary common sense, yet Central and Eastern Europe, not to mention the 
former Soviet countries, abound with examples of liberalization gone awry. Not only 
have the consequences of clumsy transitions for income and wealth distribution 
been horrendous, simple per capita GDP in many transition countries may still be 
lower than it was under communism some 15 years ago. Certainly median income is 
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often lower. These dire consequences are less evident in Central Europe, but 
increasing evident as one ventures into Eastern Europe and beyond to the former 
Soviet Union (the Baltic countries being notable exceptions).   
 
McKinnon (1993) set the template for sequencing liberalization in 1993. To quote: 
 
Before direct central government controls are fully dismantled, the monetary-fiscal-financial 
system has to be converted from the passive mode that had simply accommodated the 
planning mechanism into an active constraining influence on the ability of decentralized 
enterprises, households, and even local governments to bid for scarce resources (3). 
 
McKinnon systematically laid out the steps that liberalization should follow: 
1. “Fiscal control should precede financial liberalization”:  government 
spending should be limited to a small portion of the GNP; taxes should draw 
upon a broad base of both the population and enterprises, should be at a 
sufficiently low rate, and should be efficaciously collected; and the 
government should withdraw from most business activities. 
 
2. The domestic capital market should only be liberalized once the government 
has successfully completed the above step, and has also reduced inflationary 
off budget spending that is financed by monetary expansion.  This is so the 
capital market does not have to cope with undue pressures from a lack of 
governmental fiscal control. 
 
3. A liberalized domestic capital market must involve the payment and receipt 
of realistic interest rates, and the private ownership of banks should only 
come at the end of the domestic capital market liberalization process, when 
regulatory measures are strong and in place because of the threat of moral 
hazard . 
 
4. When the balance of payments is liberalized, it should proceed more rapidly 
on the current account than on the capital account . 
 
5. The exchange rate for both importers and exporters should be uniform prior 
to current account liberalization. 
 
6. Quotas should be replaced with tariffs and subsidies, which have a “sunset 
clause” that requires their termination within a certain time frame, so as to 
allow inefficient national industries to make the requisite efficiency gains 
rather than simply fail in an instantly open market, or stagnate in a 
protected one. 
 
7. Domestic capital market liberalization must occur prior to liberalizing the 
international capital market. 
 
8. Full capital market liberalization is the final stage of economic liberalization 
and should only occur “when domestic borrowing and lending take place 
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freely at equilibrium (unrestricted) rates of interest and the domestic rate of 
inflation is curbed so that ongoing depreciation in the exchange rate is 
unnecessary”. 
 
 
To put it mildly, McKinnon’s case for sequencing reforms was not universally 
heeded in the rush to liberalize post-communist countries. What is so astounding is 
that it took the economics profession most of a decade, after uncounted, 
unrecoverable losses in output in transition economies, to converge on a consensus 
today that is virtually identical to McKinnon’s vision in 1993.  Of course this was an 
indirect boon to researchers as it led to considerable variance in policy and in 
outcomes!  
 
A benchmark for solid empirical research on the impact on real growth of the 
various components of reform was set by Stanley Fischer et al. (1996), who defined a 
“cumulative liberalization index” using data from the first four years of transition 
and argued that speedy reforms are beneficial. A second key result was that 
macroeconomic stabilization is necessary (though not sufficient) for sustained 
growth.  De Melo et al. (1997) reinforced this result by establishing that while 
inflation stabilization was necessary, economic liberalization was equally important.  
 
Since then the literature on transition and growth has become much larger. As a 
broad generalization, it groups explanatory variables into three categories: first, 
macroeconomic variables such as inflation and budget deficits; second, variables 
that proxy structural reforms; and third, variables characterizing initial conditions. 
Initial conditions include both macroeconomic and structural indices, and a second 
set of non-economic indices that proxy for such conditions as war or internal 
conflict. Recent work (e.g., Berg et al., 1999  and Havrylyshyn et al., 2000)  has 
downplayed the importance of initial conditions (such as high levels of  planned 
industrialization, or even war), showing that timely and reasonably rapid reforms 
can compensate. This work also shows that although early, rapid liberalization 
usually causes output to fall initially, growth does rebound. And if estimates of the 
informal or “underground” economy are added to official GDP figures, measured 
recovery occurs earlier (Dean, 2004). Hence we observe U-shaped time profiles for 
growth after liberalization occurs. Dramatizing this evidence, Havrylyshyn et al., 
using a sample of 25 countries, separate transition into two Schumpeterian  periods: 
“destruction” (1990-93) and “creation” (1994 onwards).  
 
A fourth category of explanatory variables has recently come into vogue: 
“institutions”, inspired by the pioneering work of Douglas North. Havrylyshyn and 
van Rooden (2002) employ two types of indices – those related to a “legal framework 
for economic activity”, and those related to “political and civic freedom” and test  
their importance. They note that institutional reforms take much longer than does 
liberalization, privatization or restructuring. Happily for reformers seeking timely 
results, but rather surprisingly given the attention that has recently been paid to 
institutions, they find that macroeconomic stabilization combined with broad-based 
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liberalization, privatization and restructuring “remain the key determinants of 
growth in transition economies.” This result is particularly encouraging for the two 
countries currently seeking admission to the EU, Romania and Bulgaria, since 
institutional reforms, particularly related to justice and criminality, have proved 
harder to implement than stabilization and liberalization.  
 
In short, although rapid early reforms have been shown to pay off in the end, 
sequencing can be crucial. So too can coordination. Certain reforms reinforce one 
another in terms of increased growth; others do not, and may in fact interact to 
retard growth. And a second aspect of coordination has to date received little or no 
attention in the economics literature, although it is evident to any foreign-aid 
consultant in the field. Donors are often competitive rather than cooperative. They 
fail to communicate and, worse they often give conflicting advice. Witness the 
bewildering plethora of advice offered to Russia in the early 1990s.2  
 
Now, a decade after McKinnon’s 1993 message, the evidence is in: pacing and 
sequencing do matter when pursuing liberalization.  Not only does it have 
implications for the economic well being of the country, how a state structures its 
liberalization program has clear ramifications for social issues such as poverty and 
inequality.  Using episodic evidence based on financial crises, this conclusion 
becomes all the more clear. 
 
Lessons from crisis countries for sequenced liberalization 
 
Since the mid-1990s, unprecedented numbers of developing and transition countries 
have experienced financial crises. Inter alia, emerging market crises occurred in 
Mexico in 1994, Bulgaria in 1996, Czech Republic in 1997, Southeast Asia in 1997, 
Russia and Brazil in 1998, and Argentina in 2002. Bulgaria’s banking collapse in 
1996 was a stark illustration of the necessity of monetary stabilization alongside 
market liberalization. Czech Republic’s currency crisis illustrated that passing 
privatization through an immature banking system is a recipe for disaster. Mexico 
and especially Southeast Asia taught us that rapid capital inflows into a liberalized 
but unsophisticated and insufficiently supervised banking system is a recipe for 
rapid capital outflows.  
 
The message for many economists (including both Stiglitz and Bhagwati) is that 
liberalization of short-term capital flows ought not to precede appropriate 
restructuring of banks. Restructuring banks means not just moving from 
administratively directed lending to sophisticated risk-return allocation, but also 
moving toward adequate capitalization, regulation and supervision: in other words, 
deregulation of banks in terms of moving to market interest rates and accurate 
assessment of opportunity costs ought not to precede rigorous re-regulation.  
 
                                                 
2 A study in progress by Nadia Mankovska at Simon Fraser University compares policy advice given to the 
Ukrainian government by the Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID) with that given by 
the German Advisory Group.  
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Southeast Asia also brought into dispute the once-fabled Asian model of close 
cooperation between government, industry and finance: whereas in 1996 this 
cooperation was still seen by many as “symbiotic” by late 1997 it was called “crony 
capitalism”, aided and abetted by the moral hazard caused by implicit government 
guarantees on bank loans and even the exchange rate.  
 
Russia taught us that implicit guarantees by the IMF can also cause crises: 
purchases of Russian-government bonds (“GKOs”) in Frankfurt and New York 
were openly rationalized as “moral hazard plays on the IMF”.3 Brazil taught us that 
contagion matters (as did Malaysia, Indonesia and South Korea in 1997). Brazil also 
taught us that weak federalism matters, since the states were and still are able to 
force deficit sovereign finance and cause accumulation of unsustainable burdens of 
foreign debt. Argentina drove this message home, and also taught us that the 
market mechanisms and credibility  upon which so-called currency boards depend 
don’t work if wages are not flexible and if the government tinkers with the currency 
board arrangement sufficiently  to undermine credibility in the international capital 
markets.4   
 
Econometric evidence on sequencing and coordination 
 
Beyond episodes, we now have systematic econometric evidence of the importance of 
sequencing and coordinating liberalization. Drawing on various survey papers,  
Staehr (2003) generalizes as follows:  
 
1. The main findings of Fisher et al. (1996) are confirmed: both monetary 
stabilization, liberalization, and structural reforms all contribute positively 
to growth. Some studies find that liberalization and reform have negative 
effects in the short run, but some do not.  
 
2. The onset of transition per se inevitably causes a deep decline in output, even 
when reforms are very limited.5 Hence it is not reforms that cause output to 
decline.  
 
3. Growth declines and then rebounds independently of declines in factor 
inputs: labor, land, raw materials and capital. Factor inputs typically are 
reallocated according to market signals and the efficiency with which they 
are used increases. Of course one factor input – labor  – is often withdrawn 
from the formal sector: i.e. official unemployment often rises for years at a 
time as restructuring proceeds. 
                                                 
3 There is an excellent overview and analysis of these events in Desai (2004). 
4 Steven Hanke, who is the world’s leading authority on currency boards and was instrumental in helping to 
install Argentina’s “Convertibility Law” in 1991, argues that Argentina compromised the currency regime 
from the outset by permitting partial backing of the peso monetary base by domestic government debt.  
5 China is a major exception. The reforms that began in 1978 were focused on agriculture, where output 
rose almost immediately. Restructuring of industry – which was in any case a small fraction of GDP 
relative to the former Soviet Union and most Central and Eastern European transition economies – began 
later and has proceeded very gradually.  
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4. Initial structures and levels of economic development affect growth but only 
for limited periods of time.    
 
Despite this broad consensus, Staehr notes that two major lacunae remain. First, 
evidence on the individual importance of specific reforms is difficult to establish. 
This is mainly because indices of individual reforms are usually highly correlated 
with each other – they are multicollinear – liberalization, structural changes and 
privatization are typically implemented simultaneously. The second lacuna is that 
the importance of sequencing and coordination remains controversial. 
 
Staehr’s study significantly contributes to these two evidential gaps. Using annual 
data for 25 transition economies from 1989 to 20016, he estimates the impact on real 
GDP growth of eight reform indices (as well as some control variables such as 
inflation, a dummy for war, and indices of initial conditions). He uses indices 
constructed by the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) for 
the following types of reforms: 
 
Liberalization 
 
Price liberalization 
Trade and foreign exchange system 
 
Privatization 
 
Large-scale privatization 
Small-scale privatization 
 
Restructuring and institution building 
 
Banking reform and interest rate liberalization 
Introduction of securities markets and non-bank financial institutions 
Competition policy 
Governance and enterprise restructuring 
 
The econometrically innovative aspect of Staehr’s study is that he isolates principal 
components of these reform variables, in effect “netting out” multicollinearity. His 
results are as follows:  
 
1. Inflation decreases growth. 
  
2. Synchronized, broad-based reforms – the eight EBRD indices under three 
headings that are listed above – account for almost 80% of all variation in 
the indices and have positive impacts on growth in the medium term, 
although often negative short-term effects. 
                                                 
6In Asia, China, Mongolia and Vietnam are excluded, as are Bosnia and Yugoslavia in Europe.  
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3. Liberalization and small-scale reforms without other reforms account for 
8% of all variation in the EBRD indices, and again have positive medium-
term effects. 
   
4. By contrast, accelerated large-scale privatization without small-scale 
privatization and structural reforms are likely to harm growth, even in the 
medium-term. 
 
5.   Conversely, small-scale privatization without large-scale privatization is                   
beneficial to growth. 
 
6. Less certainly, freeing markets - trade and prices - without privatization and 
enterprise restructuring may lower growth. However the reverse -  
privatization and restructuring without market liberalization -  may be good 
for growth.  
 
 
Lessons from the Emerging Countries’ Experience 
 
How to sum up this part of our paper? First, complementarities between reforms 
are important: they reinforce one another. Hence the most effective reform package 
is one that is balanced and wide-ranging, involving simultaneous progress in 
liberalization, privatization and structural reforms. Second, if broad-based reforms 
are politically or otherwise impeded, it would appear that liberalization combined 
with small-scale privatization stimulates growth even in the absence of other 
reforms. These relatively easy reforms ought not to be postponed just because 
deeper and larger scale reforms are harder to implement. Conversely, certain 
sequences are detrimental to growth, notably, large- without small-scale 
privatization, market openings without accompanying reforms, and bank 
liberalization without enterprise restructuring.  
 
It is notable that these econometric results are consistent with the episodic 
circumstances surrounding financial crises discussed above, even though these crises 
occurred in developing as well as transition countries. 
 
We turn next from the developing and transition economies to the developed market 
economies. Here a different set of issues surrounding liberalization becomes 
important, although, as we shall see, there are (perhaps ironically) lessons to be 
drawn from the experience of emerging economies for those that have already 
arrived! 
 
The Optimal Speed of Liberalization 
 
While in the context of transition economies, key questions relate to the optimal 
sequencing of reform, in the context of developed market economies, the chief policy 
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questions concern the optimal speed of liberalization, in particular, the removal of 
trade barriers. Here the debate may be framed in terms of the choice between 
“shock therapy” and “gradualism”. 
 
As a matter of economic theory, the “first best” or optimal policy always entails a 
sudden removal of trade or other distortions at the very beginning of the reform 
process. This result, which one of us (Dehejia, 2003) has previously dubbed the 
“Mussa proposition”, after the economist Michael Mussa, who first articulated it 
formally, follows routinely from the fundamental theorems of welfare economics. 
Once the distortions have been removed, at the very beginning, the trajectory of 
economic variables is a fortiori efficient. This is true even if the adjustment process 
to the liberalization involves a costly and time-consuming reallocation of the 
economy’s productive resources from, say, declining import-competing to 
expanding exportable sectors. It would have been better had the distortions never 
existed, of course, but, given that they do, removing them at one fell swoop, and 
reaping the consequences, is the best that one can do. 
 
It follows as a corollary that any case for a gradual removal of trade or other 
distortions perforce rests on second best considerations. A number of such 
arguments have been furnished in the literature. They are surveyed in Dehejia 
(2003). We shall single out one particular argument, as, in our judgment, it has the 
greatest salience for the political economy of reform. The “Dehejia argument”, as 
the economist John McLaren has recently termed it, postulates that a successful 
reform program must win the support of a majority, and that in some instances 
gradualist reform may succeed in this whereas its shock therapy counterpart would 
fail. While Pareto-improving reforms may in principle be designed to ensure that no 
one is made worse off, through a lump sum tax and transfer scheme, in practice 
such compensation is rarely feasible or cannot be perfectly implemented. 
 
What, then, of a trade reform which is efficiency-enhancing in aggregate, but leaves 
some workers worse off in the short run adjustment period? Might gradualism 
work in such a case where shock therapy does not? The answer is indeed in the 
affirmative. Gradual dismantling of trade barriers, or, what amounts to the same 
thing, maintaining temporary protection, tempers the adverse income losses of 
affected groups, and makes a gradualist alternative politically palatable when a 
shock therapy reform of identical magnitude is not. 
 
There is considerable policy relevance to this argument in a variety of contexts. To 
take just one instance, the original Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, which was 
later transformed into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
included explicit provisions for the slow phase-outs of protective tariff barriers, with 
the intent of allowing affected groups in import-competing sectors an opportunity to 
adjust. In the absence of such phase-outs, a backlash might have developed which 
would have led to the stalling, or perhaps even a reversal, of the trade liberalization. 
Thus “optimal liberalization” is not necessarily immediate liberalization – it may 
require a gradualist approach. Interestingly, this result, in the context of the 
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developed market economies, is echoed in the transition experience we have 
surveyed above, in the context of the related question of sequencing. Thus, “optimal 
liberalization” also is not necessarily a “big bang”, but may need to be sequenced. 
These two sets of considerations may be interwoven, so that real world optimal 
liberalization may entail both gradualism and sequencing. 
 
 
 
Liberalization and Labor Market Outcomes 
 
While in the emerging economies of either the developing or transition varieties the 
question of capital market liberalization is still of central importance, as we have 
seen above, this is not the case in the developed market economies. In all OECD 
economies, capital markets are more or less completely liberalized, and have been 
for several decades. Interestingly, however, the important policy questions revolve 
around determining and managing the impact of liberalization on the other 
important factor of production – labor. This reflects not only the economic 
importance of labor (accounting as it does for about two-thirds of national income 
in most developed economies), but also the political clout of labor – both in the sense 
of organized labor as a lobbying force that governments must pay heed to (as 
evidenced by the important and controversial role that the AFL-CIO played in 
influencing President Bill Clinton’s public pronouncements at the failed 1999 
Seattle summit of the WTO), and of the electoral power of workers as individual 
voters.  As Bhagwati notes, liberalizing labor and immigration policies is 
contentious enough that it has lagged significantly behind adjustments to other 
factors.  As a consequence, labor mobility and immigration policy will become the 
focus of the following section. 
 
A sensible discussion of immigration policy requires that the economic analysis both 
reflect, and be situated squarely within the context of, economic and sociological 
analysis (Bhagwati 1998).  Both push, or supply side factors affecting the interest 
and willingness to emigrate, and pull, or demand side factors that affect the demand 
for immigrants in the destination country (Delisle 2002), drive citizens of 
economically disadvantaged states to migrate into more prosperous and stable ones.   
Empirical evidence of this push-pull relationships is not difficult to find. 
 
Pull factors have lead to 30 percent of Mexican born workers in the formal sector to 
work in the United States.  This figure rises to almost 40 percent when the 1.3 
million workers in the Maquiladora region are included.  Furthermore, of the 9 
million agricultural workers in North America, over 85 percent are Mexican 
(Helliwell 2004). The U.S. continues to be a demand factor since immigrants can still 
find employment in high turn over industries such as farming, manufacturing, meat 
packing industries, construction, and service jobs in places all over the country 
(Latapi et al, 2002).  As migrants begin to move into better paying jobs resulting in 
better living conditions for themselves, they often decide to reside in the United 
States on a permanent basis. This often matures into a series of network factors, that 
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lead newly permanent migrants to serve as connections for other migrants entering 
the United States.   
 
On the push side, a Spanish speaking population in the United States of over 
35 million, centralized in the border states of Arizona, Texas, New Mexico, 
California and Florida, reduces the cultural barrier to migration that is much more 
profound in the European context (Helliwell 2004).  Other supply side factors 
include: the opportunity for higher wages, better career opportunities, the 
possibility to overcome or avoid unemployment and poverty, to receive a better 
education or gain access to other segments of the social welfare system 
(Tassinopoulous and Werner, 1998).  
 
The number of migrants will only continue to rise, as will the recognition that 
wealthy states are unable to restrict the growing number of illegal immigrants, who 
circumvent the archaic immigration regimes currently in place (Miller and 
Stefanova 2004).  The continued increase in migration during the 1990s supports the 
notion that Mexican migration is continuing along a migration hump, though it 
remains unclear as to whether it is at the peak or continues along the upslope 
(Martin 2004).  Some observers believe that the upward trend on the European 
migration hump, driven by demand in a selection European destination countries, 
will continue at least another ten years and that the sole means to reduce it is 
through economic convergence (Alba 2004).   This is supported by a recent 
EUROPOLL that asked Europeans what they would do to improve their career 
prospects.  While 22 percent answered “further training”, and fifteen percent said 
they would “change jobs”, with nine percent answering that they would simply 
“work harder”, the majority of Europeans who responded (fifty-two percent) 
answered that they would “leave the country” to improve their career prospects.7
 
Economic liberalization, and the question of “how much” to liberalize, is implicated 
in at least two major ways: the potentially malign direct effects of trade 
liberalization on the wages of (especially unskilled) workers, and the indirect effects 
through the mediating channel of labor standards. Critics of globalization in the 
United States particularly argue that “excessive” liberalization of trade barriers has 
induced a sharp increase in wage inequality, with university-educated, skilled 
workers gaining at the expense of uneducated, unskilled workers. This is often 
coupled with the claim that liberalization of trade and capital flows, by making 
firms more cost-conscious and footloose, has led to a degradation of labor standards. 
This latter argument came to the fore during the 1992 US Presidential election 
campaign, when the third candidate, Ross Perot, argued against the NAFTA, 
claiming that it would pit American against Mexican workers in what he evocatively 
termed a “race to the bottom”. Ironically, this echoes fears that were expressed in 
Canada during the 1988 federal election, fought on the issue of the proposed 
Canada – US FTA, when some argued that the increased mobility of goods and 
people across the border would induce a worsening of Canadian social institutions 
                                                 
7 See http://europa.eu.int/eures/home.jsp?lang=en for complete EUROPOLL questions and responses 
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and labor and environmental standards down to US levels. We shall assess these two 
sets of claims in turn. 
 
On the first, more conventional, argument, that trade liberalization reduces the 
wages of unskilled workers, and thereby increases what labor economists refer to as 
the “wage premium” earned by skilled workers, what do theory and empirics have 
to say? As a matter of economic theory, the argument is perfectly sound, and can be 
rationalized as an instance of what is known to trade economists as the “Stolper-
Samuelson theorem”: protection benefits the scarce factor of production and harms 
the abundant factor, and conversely trade liberalization benefits the abundant 
factor and harms the scarce factor. If we imagine a stylization of the world pattern 
of relative endowments in which the poor countries of the “South” are abundant in 
unskilled labor, and the rich countries of the “North” are abundant in capital and 
skilled labor, it follows that the South will export unskilled-labor-intensive goods, 
such as primary commodities or low-value-added manufactures, to the North, which 
in turn will export skill- and capital-intensive goods, such as high-value-added 
manufactures and services, to the South. Given this pattern, successive waves of 
trade liberalization will benefit skilled workers, and harm unskilled workers, in the 
North, with the reverse holding in the South. 
 
In a 1993 conference at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, DC, 
perhaps the first to investigate such claims systematically, one of us (Dehejia) and 
Jagdish Bhagwati cast doubt on this conventional trade-based explanation, arguing 
both that it is not a theoretical necessity, and further that it fails to match the 
empirical evidence (Bhagwati and Dehejia, 1994). In brief, the conventional 
(Stolper-Samuelson) trade explanation rests on very strong theoretical assumptions, 
so that it should in no sense be considered an “iron law”. Further, even if we grant 
that the mechanism could be at work, it is not borne out empirically: relative prices 
of unskilled-labor-intensive goods have, if anything, risen in the United States, and 
all sectors of the economy have become more intensive in the use of skilled labor, 
both of which are at variance with the conventional explanation. We therefore 
argued that the conventional trade explanation carried, if at all, little explanatory 
power, with the chief “culprit” instead being skill-biased technological change. 
While this view was then controversial, it has now become the conventional wisdom. 
 
We went on, however, to suggest an alternative, trade-based explanation, which we 
hypothesized may be of some importance, albeit secondary, to the technological 
explanation. This alternative explanation, which in the empirical trade literature 
has come to be known as the “Bhagwati-Dehejia hypothesis”, postulates essentially a 
link from international trade to unskilled wages through an increase in job turnover, 
induced by greater volatility of patterns of comparative advantage, or what we 
called “kaleidoscopic comparative advantage”. The mechanism that we had in mind 
was that increased turnover would have a more deleterious effect on unskilled 
workers than skilled, as the former often possess firm-specific training whereas the 
latter embody more general-education-based human capital. A complementary 
causal channel would be that unskilled workers suffer a longer unemployment spell 
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between jobs than skilled workers, thus further widening the gap in human capital 
accumulation and hence exacerbating wage inequality. 
 
This, of course, is a hypothesis, whose importance must be tested empirically. We 
are not aware of a systematic test for the United States, but, in a recent study using 
Canadian data, we have found support for the Bhagwati-Dehejia hypothesis as one 
of the contributors of wage inequality in Canada in the 1990s (Beaulieu, Dehejia, 
and Zakhiwal, 2004). 
 
We turn next to the alternative, indirect mechanism through which “excessive” 
liberalization may harm workers, via the “race to the bottom”. Again, we wish to 
ask two questions, can the argument be made theoretically cogent, and what does 
the evidence have to say? 
 
As a matter of economic theory, the “race to the bottom” is an instance of what 
Hans-Werner Sinn (2003) has termed “systems competition”. To be more precise, it 
may be the result of strategic behavior by different jurisdictions competing for 
mobile capital and firms. In the first best, cooperative equilibrium, all jurisdictions 
keep standards high, and there is no distortion to firms’ investment decisions. But, 
depending on the incentive structure of the game, there may be a temptation for any 
one jurisdiction to defect from the cooperative solution, and lure mobile capital by 
offering laxer labor (or for that matter environmental) standards, on the 
assumption that this reduces firms’ production costs and may make that particular 
jurisdiction a more attractive location to set up shop. This may then lead to a 
classical Prisoners’ Dilemma, in which, in the noncooperative equilibrium, all 
jurisdictions set standards too low, and yet no one benefits, as there is no change in 
the marginal incentive to locate in any one jurisdiction. If they could, jurisdictions 
would commit to raising standards to the optimal level, and, if they did so 
simultaneously, there would be no associated loss in competitiveness to any one 
jurisdiction. In the absence of a credible commitment device, however, such as an 
internationally enforceable treaty, jurisdictions will be stuck in the “bad” 
equilibrium. 
 
It is, of course, an empirical question how strong these incentives for strategic 
behavior on the part of governments are, and whether they exert a sufficiently 
strong effect on firms’ profitability actually to induce a downward spiral in 
standards. In a recent study, we examine these questions using a formal econometric 
test, and find no evidence to support the claim that weaker labor standards increase 
the attractiveness of countries to inward foreign direct investment or increase their 
export competitiveness (Dehejia and Samy, 2004). But the evidence is still 
preliminary, and to be fair the jury is still out on the potential importance of this 
causal mechanism, especially in the context of regional trade agreements such as 
NAFTA, in which there is, at any rate, anecdotal evidence of firms relocating to 
jurisdictions with laxer labor and environmental standards (such as US firms 
operating in the maquilladoras in Mexico along the border, whose sole purpose is 
export back to the US market, duty free access being guaranteed by NAFTA). 
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The evident disconnect between theoretical and empirical suppositions about the 
impact of liberalizing labor mobility, coupled with the political contention that has 
consistently surrounded the topic, makes the idea of “big bang” liberalization in any 
regional context generally inconceivable.  The question than becomes how to 
manage the demands of a growing number of immigrants and potential workers in 
light of political resistance in most domestic contexts.   The answer is not a simple 
one. Because in most nations labour mobility and migration is managed almost 
exclusively at the border, the nature of the role played by the border regime – and 
its impact on the effectiveness of the policy regime – should be recognized as 
particularly relevant when developing recommendations for labor policies. 
 
Seemingly paradoxically, but upon reflection not so – particularly given the 
strategies employed by most developed nations - some labor economists argue that 
stricter border security actually results in a higher number of illegal immigrants, 
because migrants who had previously gone back and forth for work are more 
reluctant to return, as the chances of being caught have increased. The problems 
caused by this artificial worker retention include a perceived displacement of 
domestic workers by low-wage laborers, the strain placed on country relations, the 
cost of patrolling a volatile border area, and the social costs of families separated by 
the pursuit of economic prosperity.   
 
This theory is supported empirically by one of the largest migration relationships  
today, which takes place across the Mexico – United States border.  A brief cross-
temporal analysis will illustrate that there is a consistent if not growing migratory 
pressures being absorbed by the U.S. economy.  This pressure - measured by the 
number of applications relative to the number of available visas, coupled with the 
amount of migration occurring outside the official regime (i.e., illegal migration), 
has seen little improvement despite ongoing political demand for change.   
 
The Mexico-U.S. labor relationship began long before NAFTA, thought it was not 
until the United States entered the First World War and domestic labor shortages 
began to develop, did U.S. commence begin drawing on the labor pools of other 
nations.  Structural changes in the U.S. economy also increased the demand for 
foreign workers as the agriculture sector continued to develop labour shortages,  
further exacerbating the need to look abroad  (Rodrigues – Scott 2002)  Because of 
Mexico’s close proximity, negotiations towards a guest worker program were called 
between then President Roosevelt and Mexican President Avila Camacho. The 
Mexican Farm Labour Program (MFLP), or Bracero program, provided contracts 
for Mexicans to migrate into the United States and fill jobs in sectors facing a 
shortage of workers. 
 
Since then American immigration policy towards Mexico has reflected the desire to 
balance traditional security concerns with pressing economic demands continuing to 
grow domestically.   This early period in the US – Mexico relationship illustrates the 
largely reactive and unsystematic nature of U.S. immigration policy toward Mexico.  
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It was not until the passing of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 that 
an overarching policy was established, which led to a temporary decrease in the 
importance of immigration issues to Presidential administrations and Congress 
(Rodrigues – Scott 2002).   But by the mid-1980s it became apparent that a new 
policy was needed in order to deal with the failings of previous policies.  The 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) was passed to control 
unauthorized immigration to the United States. Employer sanctions, increased 
appropriations for enforcement, and amnesty provisions of IRCA were the primary 
means of accomplishing its objective. Employer sanctions provisions designate 
penalties for employers who hire aliens not authorized to work in the United States. 
Under the amnesty provision, illegal aliens who lived continuously in the United 
States since before January 1, 1982, were eligible to apply to the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) for legal resident status by May 4, 1988, the application 
cut-off date.8
 
The impact of the policies developed by various administrations appear to have 
done very little to curb migration from Mexico, and in fact may have even promoted 
an increase in illegal migration.  The growth of immigration fees between 1921 and 
1924 prompted the onset of illegal migration; a problem further exacerbated by the 
Great Depression and political instability in Mexico.  It is highly questionable 
whether the IRCA was at all effective in reducing the number of undocumented 
individuals entering the United States in search of employment. Studies tend to 
argue that IRCA only increased illegal immigration to the United States. Statistics 
by the U.S. Bureau of the Census and the INS certainly do not reflect a decrease. 
The average annual growth of illegal migration into the United States between 1992 
and 1996 was over 275 000; illegal Mexican migration comprised 145 000 of this 
figure.9
 
Migration flows have not stopped or significantly decreased for two main reasons. 
First, migration has become a social process. Secondly, conditions in the country of 
origin are not favorable enough to deter migrants from taking dangerous risks in 
crossing the border illegally or in many cases having to live through much difficult 
time in the U.S. due to language and cultural barriers, discrimination and isolation, 
and lack of work or educational skills.  The number of aliens located and/or expelled 
from the United States has continued to increase steadily since the 1960s; a strong 
indication that both the number of aliens living the country had increased, as had 
the level of enforcement occurring. 
  
The basis of policy theory during the NAFTA period focused on the 
liberalization of production factors relative to the restrictive regulations on labour 
movement from Mexico into the United States.   The countries’ rhetoric focused on 
public safety and the need to educate migrants about the potential dangers of 
crossing the border (Waslin 2003).   But the risk of increased economic instability 
                                                 
8 See U.S. Department of Agriculture at http://www.usda.gov/agency/oce/oce/labour-affairs/ircasumm.htm
9 See United States Citizenship and Immigration Services at 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/299.htm
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became apparent as the movement of capital was relatively free and movement of 
labour relatively restricted.  In this situation, a recessionary situation is further 
enhanced as capital can move to another country where interest rates are higher, 
but labor must remain, pushing unemployment rates potentially even higher.  
Furthermore, in a period of strong economic growth, capital inflows can increase 
dramatically, but labor cannot follow suit and maximize the productivity of capital. 
 
Towards the end of the early NAFTA period, serious discussions were beginning 
between Mexican President Fox and U.S. President Bush; talks held much promise 
and the scope for a co-operative approach to labour migration was being established.  
The Presidents had agreed to a set of “guiding principles” for migration that 
included: a humane approach, protection of American workers, fairness, joint 
commitment, and a new temporary worker program.10  Unfortunately, all the 
promise of negotiations between Mexico and the United States during the NAFTA 
period came to a dramatic halt on September 11th, 2001. The attacks on that day on 
the World Trade Centre and Pentagon would move security back to the top of the 
U.S. agenda and eliminate any hopes of the Mexican “whole enchilada” being 
realized in the near future.  The most positive impact was that the pre September 11 
dialogue on reforms did set a precedent for future talks on the liberalization of the 
border regime. 
 
Although no census figures are currently available for the post September 
11th period, it is widely believed that the population of illegal Mexican 
migrants in the United States continues to grow, despite a lull immediately 
after September 11th and the further increase of U.S. personnel at the border. 
 
Clearly the various programs developed by the United States have had minimal 
impact on illegal migration or more broadly, migratory pressure.  Of the 1.65 
million aliens apprehended in 1996, 1.6 million were from Mexico, and in 
comparison with a legal migration growth in 1996 from Mexico of 164 000, the 
illegal migration growth in 1996 was 154 000.  In all, of the 5 million illegal aliens 
estimated to be living in the United States in 1996, some 2.7 million were believed to 
be from Mexico.11
 
The ideal migration system has no migration barriers and a low level of actual 
migration.   This is ideal for several reasons.  First, mass migration in either 
direction is an economically destabilizing factor12.  As was previously discussed, a 
sudden influx of labor has the potential to displace the native workforce, depress 
wages, increase underemployment and strain a nation’s welfare system.  A sudden 
                                                 
10 See U.S. Department of State at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2001/fsjulydec/5019.htm
11 See United States Citizenship and Immigration Services at 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/299.htm
12 In most cases mass migration also strains a country’s political system and has in extreme cases led to 
civil unrest and even violent conflict.  While we recognize the significance of these phenomena, 
political/sociological destabilization is not our focus, so we shall not say much more about this important 
question. 
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exodus of labor can create an underutilization of the other factors of production, 
lower productivity and raise the overall cost of living (Dornbusch et al 2002). 
 
Therefore, the ideal migration situation is one in which there are few significant 
incentives to migrate between countries.   However, coming to a point at which 
push-pull factors are substantially mitigated will not be achieved with archaic 
border tactics like those currently employed by the United States.  In order for free 
labour mobility to be accomplished, a convergence must occur on both an economic 
and a political level; convergence on the economic level of wages, incomes and 
opportunities (Martin 2004) and a convergence of rights that will lead to a higher 
level of public acceptance of continuing migration (Polaski 2004).  So long as this 
convergence does not occur to an appreciable level, it will be politically and 
economically infeasible to realize the free movement of people, particularly within 
the North American context.  
 
While this topic requires a systematic analysis that has not been conducted to date, 
preliminary research seems to indicate that it is possible to have free movement of 
labor across a border between a less developed and a more developed country, if the 
shift towards free movement of labour is gradually introduced over a long enough 
time frame to permit demographic and structural changes to take effect.  This will 
require a fundamental change in the border regime from the current system, that 
fosters both illegal migration and discontent among potential migrants, to one that 
acknowledges the need for managed large scale legal migration to ensure long-term 
economic stability in the region. 
 
Optimal Process: Unilateral, Multilateral, Plurilateral, or Mixed? 
 
We have examined to this point questions around the optimal extent of 
liberalization, and related questions on speed, sequencing, and impacts on salient 
groups such as labor. The question that we address in this section concerns the 
optimal process of achieving the ends of liberalization. Should liberalization be 
achieved unilaterally, by an individual state acting alone? Should it be achieved 
instead multilaterally, through international institutions (e.g., the WTO)? Should it 
be achieved through smaller groupings of countries, either of two countries, in 
which case bilateral liberalization, or three or more, in which case plurilateral 
liberalization? Or, should a mixed approach be adopted, with some of each of these 
elements in play? 
 
There is a strong tradition in international economics, going back to Smith and 
Ricardo, extolling the virtues of unilateral liberalization. The very point of the 
debates around the repeal of the Corn Laws was that Great Britain could benefit by 
repealing its tariffs on foreign grains and moving unilaterally to free trade, even if 
unreciprocated by any of its trading partners. The success of Britain as a unilateral 
liberalizer ensured that this remained the orthodoxy until the end of the 19th 
century. At that point, with Britain entering a period of relative economic decline, 
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and the rise of the United States, there arose claims for “reciprocity”: that is, trade 
liberalization by one party should be matched by reciprocal concessions from its 
trading partners. This was the foundation of the multilateral, rules-based system of 
trade negotiations embodied in the GATT and its successor the WTO. 
 
To some economists reciprocity smacks of mercantilism, since it seems to imply that 
there cannot be gain with unilateral liberalization, which is patently incorrect. What 
this criticism misses is that reciprocity has a strategic, or more specifically a 
negotiating, value for countries. After all, if one unilaterally eliminates all of one’s 
trade barriers, one has nothing left to negotiate with, and hence no levers to pry 
open protected foreign markets. If one liberalizes, and so does one’s trading partner, 
in a reciprocal negotiation, then there is a “double gain”. Having said that, it is a 
pertinent observation that trade negotiations are conducted for the most part by 
lawyers, not economists, who are schooled in the doctrine of an adversarial system, 
and hence of a zero sum game, which is a misleading metaphor when it comes to 
trade liberalization. 
 
Quite distinct from the question of unilateral vs. reciprocal trade liberalization is 
the issue of whether reciprocal negotiations should be pursued multilaterally or 
plurilaterally. Here too, the conventional wisdom has shifted in recent years. After 
the Second World War, with the establishment of the GATT, the American and 
indeed Canadian view was that negotiations should be centered at the GATT in 
Geneva, and that regional or preferential trading agreements should be discouraged, 
or pursued only under special circumstances. Such circumstances evidently existed 
in the case of the European Community, whose creation was as much a political act 
of reunifying former wartime adversaries, and in particular embedding Germany 
and France in a common political and economic project which would make future 
hostilities between them unthinkable. But the United States steadfastly refused to 
participate in such preferential arrangements, the sole exception being the bilateral 
trade agreement with Israel, which is much more a tool of foreign policy than of 
economic policy. 
 
The turning point came during the negotiations of the original Canada – US Free 
Trade Agreement in 1988, between the Republican administration of President 
Ronald Reagan in the United States and the Conservative government of Prime 
Minister Brian Mulroney in Canada. This represented an about-face for the 
Americans, and was a calculated strategy to reinvigorate the faltering Uruguay 
Round negotiations at the GATT, which were bogged down due to European 
intransigence. The US rationale was that since the multilateral route was 
temporarily unavailable, it would travel the preferential route instead. Canadian 
rationale was much simpler: to lock in access to its largest trader partner, freeing it 
from the vagaries of the multilateral process, which appeared to be stalled. 
 
As it turned out, the Canada – US FTA proved to be a watershed, in that it marked 
a decisive shift in the US attitude towards preferential trade agreements, which 
were now not only tolerated but actively pursued in tandem with, and sometimes to 
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the detriment of, the multilateral process. This trend, begun in the Reagan and Bush 
Senior administrations, accelerated during the Clinton administration, and has 
continued apace during the Bush Junior administration. 
 
While economists agree that multilateral trade agreements are preferable to 
preferential trade agreements, because they avoid the possibility of welfare-
worsening “trade diversion” and ensure “trade creation” (the celebrated terms 
coined by Jacob Viner), in practice the choice between them, or the pursuit of both 
channels simultaneously, is often a matter of political expediency, not of economic 
calculus. The degradation of the public discourse is such that all trade agreements, 
whether of the multilateral or preferential variety, are lumped together as free trade! 
 
Amongst trade policy commentators today, Jagdish Bhagwati is the staunched and 
most vocal critic of the regionalization of trade policy. In his view, this represents a 
fragmentation of the global trading system, and leads to what he colorfully describes 
as a “spaghetti bowl” of crisscrossing trade preferences and their increasingly 
arcane and convoluted rules of origin (necessitated by the fact that these are 
typically not customs unions, hence without common external tariffs). On this view, 
then, the proliferation of regional and preferential trading agreements, in the 
Americas, Europe, and elsewhere, creates a distortion in the global pattern of trade, 
and represents the wrong sort of liberalization. The Bhagwati proposal is to freeze 
the growth of, if not roll back, such preferential agreements, and work instead to 
bolster the multilateral system as embodied in the WTO. 
 
As against this, analysts such as Gary Hufbauer of the Institute for International 
Economics in Washington, DC, and Michael Hart of the Paterson School at 
Carleton University, argue to the contrary, that regional trade agreements are the 
platform from which to build deeper integration initiatives than those that are 
possible at the multilateral level, and to serve as a laboratory for integration 
initiatives that may eventually be transferred to the multilateral sphere. This 
alternative view is much more benign towards the proliferation of preferential 
agreements, seeing them as “building blocks” rather than “stumbling blocks” (in 
Bhagwati’s noted phraseology) towards eventual multilateral liberalization. 
 
Conclusion: The Optimal “Breadth” and “Depth” of Liberalization 
 
To conclude, and to return to the questions with which we began this paper, we 
reflect on the lessons that may be learned from our foregoing survey and synthesis 
of theory, empirics, and policy analysis, in both emerging and developed market 
economies. To summarize our enquiry pithily, we may ask: Is maximal liberalization 
always optimal? Or does optimal policy in some instances entail limiting the breadth 
and depth of liberalization? 
 
Our analysis evidently reveals that while, in theory, and in a first best world, 
maximal liberalization may indeed be optimal, in the second best world of practical 
policymaking, it often is not. Thus, we have seen that “big bang” and “shock 
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therapy” reform strategies that are preferred on paper, have come a cropper in 
practice. Instead, prudence suggests an appropriate sequencing of reforms, to 
ensure macroeconomic stability, and a gradual dismantling of protective barriers, to 
allow affected groups to adjust at the micro level. 
 
By contrast, we have seen that some commonly articulated fears about globalization, 
centering on putative adverse effects on workers’ wages and labor standards, while 
theoretically possible are empirically contentious.  Robert Hunter Wade (2004) 
usefully reminds us that statistical measures are controversial, and can be easily 
manipulated to make whatever case the author wishes.  The fear of globalization is 
often hinged on misconceptions, on both sides, of what the other is trying to achieve.  
But as Bhagwati (2004) so eloquently articulates, globalization does have a human 
face, and can be a positive force for change. 
 
What does this tell us, in the end, about the liberalization project, and its 
international dimension: that is, globalization in particular? We can surely agree 
with Jagdish Bhagwati, who argues that the old question, whether  globalization is 
“good” or “bad” for welfare, workers, the environment, or whatever else, while it 
may animate ideological debates in the academy, does not resonate in the policy 
realm. Policymakers across the political spectrum have accepted the notion that 
globalization is inevitable, and that turning the clock back and “de-globalizing” is 
simply not a feasible option. The policy-relevant question that then follows is, how 
should each nation best manage the globalization enterprise so as to maximize the 
benefits, and minimize the harms, that accrue therefrom? And, how should the 
institutions that regulate international economic relations be improved so as to 
maximize the gains, and minimize the harms, of globalization, for citizens of 
emerging and developed market economies alike? These questions are a perfect 
instance of what Hans-Werner Sinn has dubbed the “selection principle”: that 
governments should refrain from interfering where markets function well, and 
intervene optimally to correct market failures where these exist, either at the 
national or supranational level, and if necessary through intergovernmental 
cooperation. 
 
These are difficult questions, and we doubt that there is a universal answer. Rather, 
we expect that the particular circumstances of each individual country will 
inevitably shape the optimal solution for that country. Nonetheless, we would argue 
broadly that policy measures that might mitigate putative national welfare losses 
from globalization include appropriate governance, transparency, optimal 
regulation of labor, product and financial markets, institutional safeguards, and 
adjustment assistance. These will ensure that the fruits of globalization are spread 
as widely as possible, and ameliorate its possible harms. So while Stiglitz highlights 
losers and Bhagwati winners, the “optimal” liberalization should create winners 
without losers. 
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